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Over recent decades, the Chinese government has invested heavily in 18 
improving the country’s forest tenure system through the Collective Forest 19 
Tenure Reform. This reform has primarily focused on privatization of 20 
collectively-owned forests, which has been perceived to improve effective forest 21 
management by providing incentives to farmers. This paper documents results 22 
of the Collective Forest Tenure Reform and the factors that have shaped these 23 
results through a multi-level analysis: at the national, regional, community and 24 
individual levels. It was found forest privatization implemented through the 25 
tenure reform was much less than what government expected. Instead, as shown 26 
in illustrative case-studies, people intend to retain the forest as common 27 
property in a way that creates a complex communal forest management system. 28 
The paper argued that while it is good the government is willing to improve 29 
forest tenure security for local people, there is a need to better consider the local 30 
perceptions of the tenure reform policy’s effectiveness and efficiency, and justice 31 
in forest management, and to understand the complexity of the pre-existing 32 
communal forest management system that exists throughout the country.  33 
 34 
Keyword: Collective Forest Tenure Reform; communal management; 35 






1. Introduction  41 
China’s collectively-owned forests account for the largest share of the world’s 42 
community forests, comprising over 60% of the total community forest resource in Asia 43 
and the Pacific (Sikor et al., 2013) and reaching nearly 30% of the resource among the 44 
52 most forested countries in the world (RRI, 2014). These collectively-owned forests 45 
comprise about 60% of China’s total forest area (State Council 2008) and contribute 46 
significantly to regional and global environmental services and the rural livelihoods of 47 
about 600 million households in China (Xu, 2010). Since 2003, the Chinese government 48 
has initiated a new round of Collective Forest Tenure Reform to promote tenure 49 
devolution, which follows an earlier forest reform from the 1980s. Learning from the 50 
success of privatization1 in agricultural and industrial sectors, this reform aimed to 51 
provide incentives to farmers for forest management by promoting individual forest 52 
holdings through an egalitarian distribution of the collectively-owned forest resource2. 53 
The government believes this privatization of the collective forest resource would 54 
improve the forest condition and local livelihoods (c.f. Xu and Hyde, 2019). To ensure 55 
the stability and constancy of this forest tenure reform, the central government invested 56 
approximately USD 370 million in the boundary delineation, surveying, titling and 57 
registration of the new plots since 2008 (Xu et al. 2010). The government also aimed to 58 
accomplish its key mission to clarify property rights and allocate at least 80% of the 59 
collective forest to individual households by 2013 (State Council, 2008). As such, China’s 60 
collective forest tenure reform has attracted considerable international attention. 61 
Research into this reform would make a significant contribution to global experiences 62 
with forest tenure reform and community forestry development (Hyde, 2019).  63 
 64 
There is a growing international literature on China’s Collective Forest Tenure 65 
Reform (CFTR). Much of this research has focused on examining the reform’s outcomes 66 
in terms of incentivizing local investment in forest management and has concluded 67 
there have been positive effects as a result of improved tenure security (Qin et al., 2011; 68 
Yi et al., 2014; Qin and Xu, 2013; Xie et al., 2014; Ren et al., 2018; Huang et al., 2019; 69 
Zhou et al., 2018; Lu et al., 2016; Li et al., 2016; He, et al.. 2015; Liu et al., 2017; Wei and 70 
He 2016). Others have taken a critical perspective to investigate how local conditions 71 
may affect the reform, finding the tenure reform has led to conflict between de facto and 72 
de jure tenure arrangements (Liu et al., 2016; Luo et al., 2015). Taking a case-study 73 
approach at a local level, scholars have also revealed the local variation in governance 74 
processes have shaped the implementation of the reform and generated mixed results 75 
(e.g. He and Sikor, 2017; Zinda and Zhang, 2018). At a higher level, many others have 76 
suggested there are a range of institutional challenges with the reform, including 77 
property rights ambiguity (Ho, 2014; He, 2016), top-down implementation (Robbins 78 
                         
1 This paper considers privatization to refer to the transfer of resource use rights and control from pubic or 
collective control to individuals, instead of a narrow definition of transferring ownership to private interests.   
2 It is the government’s perspective that collective ownership leads to inefficient resource use, while forest 
privatization has been promoted, as influenced by Hardin (1968). 
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and Harrell, 2014; Yin, et al., 2013), and potential institutional conflicts (Liu et al., 2016; 79 
Hyde and Yin, 2019). However, the actual results of privatization in this reform remain 80 
unclear in terms of changing areas under different forest property regimes. In particular, 81 
there is a lack of understanding of the factors affecting those changes. Thus, new 82 
evidence supported by a novel analysis of the forest tenure reform is urgently needed to 83 
provide thoughtful insights into China’s Collective Forest Tenure Reform. 84 
 85 
At a global level, forest tenure reform has been widely implemented to allocate 86 
forests to Indigenous people and communities across the world (Yin et al., 2016; Larson 87 
and Dahal, 2012; Sikor et al., 2017; RRI, 2014). While existing literature has evidenced 88 
the positive aspects of tenure reform in improving forest condition and local livelihoods 89 
(Blackman and Veit, 2018; Mistry and Berardi, 2016; Robinson et al., 2014, 2018), 90 
research also calls for particular attention to understanding legal pluralisms (Gebara, 91 
2018), customary institutions (Linkow, 2016), local governance (Larson, 2011), forest 92 
tenure diversification (He et al., 2014), and conflict between formal and actual tenure 93 
(Sikor, 2006). Taking the analytical framework of forest decentralization, scholars have 94 
highlighted that positive effects of devolving forest tenure systems can be limited by a 95 
lack of downward accountability mechanisms (Ribot et al., 2006), elite capture (Lund 96 
and Saito-Jensen, 2013), institutional constraints (Sahide et al., 2016) and insufficient 97 
power transfer (He and Xu, 2017). Among these studies, devolving forest tenure to local 98 
communities is a primary focus, while rare attention has been paid to forest devolution 99 
through privatization. There is a gap in understandings of the factors affecting the 100 
implementation of forest privatization, particularly in the case of China, the country with 101 
the largest share of community forests in the world. To fill the gap, there is a need to 102 
obtain thoughtful insights into forest tenure reform by combining large-scale analysis 103 
with local case-studies. Doing so in a way that combines qualitative and quantitative 104 
approaches would provide additional evidence-based knowledge to the international 105 
literature.  106 
 107 
Unlike the existing literature, this study examines the results of CFTR via a 108 
multi-level analysis conducted at the national, regional, community and individual levels. 109 
This multi-level analysis enables a comprehensive understanding of the connectivity of 110 
the social-ecological system, as what happens at one level can affect the result at another 111 
level (Young, 2006; Ostrom et al., 2007; Brondizio et al., 2009). As such, the research 112 
aims to answer two key questions: 1) What is the actual result of privatization through 113 
the CFTR at the national and regional levels?, and 2) What factors affected the tenure 114 
reform result, in terms of learning from empirically-grounded analysis at the village and 115 
individual household levels? Thus, the central contribution of this research is to provide 116 
thoughtful insights into those two questions as additions to the existing literature. The 117 
research also makes an empirical contribution to the policy debate on forest devolution 118 
and provides timely information to Chinese policymakers for improving the current 119 
CFTR policy. The policy implications are also globally relevant.  120 
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 121 
2. China’s Collective Forest Tenure Reform (CFTR): A historical overview 122 
 123 
China’s collective forests emerged in the 1950s alongside the establishment of the 124 
People’s Republic of China, when the government transferred individually-managed 125 
forestland to collective management under the communist system (Liu, 2001; Miao and 126 
White, 2004). Within the commune system, village cooperatives were established as the 127 
forestland holders, and farmers enrolled as cooperative members to secure their access 128 
to farmland and forestland (Grinspoon, 2002). This collectivization policy continued 129 
throughout the years of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution from the 130 
mid-1950s to the end of the 1970s. However, the forest collectivization created 131 
problems in the form of environmental degradation and slow economic development 132 
(e.g. Menzies, 1994; Shapiro, 2001; Grinspoon, 2002). 133 
 134 
Following the success in agricultural privatization, the forestry reform began in 1982 135 
with the reallocation of the collective forestland to individual households across the 136 
entire nation to ensure the individual use rights to forests (Liu et al., 2019). The reform 137 
aimed to promote afforestation and effective forest management to alleviate poverty. As 138 
such, the reform attempted to provide incentives to farmers through the “Three Fix” 139 
(Linye shanding) approach: 1) clarifying forest boundaries, 2) distributing collective 140 
non-forested land to rural households (called “Private Freehold Mountain” or Ziliushan 141 
自留山), and 3) introducing the “Responsibility System” to set up “Responsibility 142 
Mountain” (Zerenshan 责任山) for the collectively-owned forest by using contracts to 143 
allow individual forest management (Liu et al., 2019). 144 
 145 
The first tenure reform did not achieve the objective expected by the government and its 146 
outcome was less than positive. The rural people’s lack of confidence in the security of 147 
their tenure meant that the Freehold Mountain allocations did not generate much 148 
enthusiasm for tree plantations (He, 2016; Liu et al., 2019). Studies reported a decline in 149 
forest areas as market forces and badly-defined tenure arrangements led to many 150 
forests under the Responsibility Mountain policy being felled for cash income (e.g. Xu et 151 
al., 2005; He, 2012). The overexploitation and short-sighted management of the forests 152 
was encouraged by the policy’s short periods of tenure and various ambiguities (Ho, 153 
2001; Liu et al., 2019). In 1985, a harvest quota system was imposed to halt the rapid 154 
cutting of collectively-owned forests, but this policy change again led to tenure 155 
insecurity (He, 2016). The central government stopped allocating forest rights to 156 
individual households in 1987, and thus titling the forest to the holders was ceased. The 157 
problems of the lack of institutional credibility and the uncertain benefits of forest 158 
management called for improvements to the forest sector reform policy. 159 
 160 
In 2003, the second round of the CFTR commenced. Learning from the previous reform 161 
attempts, the second round paid great attention to forest privatization as part of a 162 
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broader social and political trend, aiming for privatization of the rural landscape and the 163 
establishment of a free market (Xu et al., 2010; He and Sikor, 2017). This reform was 164 
originally initiated as a pilot study in Fujian Province, where the provincial government 165 
allocated collectively-owned forests to individual households with clarification of the 166 
individual households’ rights to use and benefit from their forest. This pilot privatization 167 
of forest tenure improved the incentive for farmers to invest in their forests. The central 168 
government then called for nationwide reform in 2005. In July 2008, a new national 169 
policy was officially publicized by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 170 
China and the State Council. Up to the end of 2010, the forest tenure reform had been 171 
implemented in 28 provinces involving around 500 million rural forest dependents (Xu 172 
et al., 2010).  173 
 174 
The second forest tenure reform emphasized a rights-based approach, differing from the 175 
previous reform in its purpose: to ensure meaningful individual rights over forest 176 
resources. To ensure the privatization of forests, the key task identified by the 177 
government was to clarify and secure farmers’ meaningful rights to forest management 178 
and securing farmers’ ownership of forests and their right to use forestland, with a 179 
70-year contract and the forestland remaining under ownership of the collectives (Yin, 180 
2014; He and Sikor, 2017). The privatization effort therefore took a form of the 181 
government clarifying and securing the farmers’ four rights of forest tenure, including: 182 
use rights of forestland, management rights of forest and forestland, the right to forest 183 
disposal, and the right to benefit financially from the forest (State Council 2008)3. Also, 184 
the second reform enabled local autonomy and self-governance in forest redistribution. 185 
This reform policy gives village assemblies full decision-making power regarding how 186 
much collective forest should be turned over to individual households and how much 187 
should remain as a collective resource. The rights to the latter portion remain vested in 188 
the democratically-elected village committee. With this, the central government aims to 189 
create a meaningful forest decentralization, ensuring local benefits while also meeting 190 
the variability in regional needs (He, 2012). 191 
 192 
Although there is goal of promoting local participation and securing local rights to forest 193 
resources, the central government has established a range of principles for 194 
implementing the forest tenure reform policy that have limited local decision-making4. 195 
The central government also encourages the privatization of collective forests by 196 
defining a percentage of privatization of the total collective forest area as key indicator 197 
to evaluate the achievement in each province. At the national level, there is a goal of 198 
privatizing 80% of the collective forest in each province. In addition, while the central 199 
government has proposed a five-year period for the task of clarifying property rights, 200 
                         
3 The four tenure rights differed from Schlager and Ostrom’s bundle of rights (1992), where the Chinese 
Government emphasized the right to use and benefit from the forest. 
4 In practice, to meet the high rate of privatization and fast accomplishment of forest titling, the village level 
plan of reform is mainly implemented in a top-down approach (see also Robbins and Harrell, 2014, He and 
Sikor 2017).  
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the provincial and local governments are pushing for a shorter period to demonstrate 201 
their local capability so they can request further investment from the central 202 
government (He and Sikor, 2017). The clash between the state’s goal and local practices 203 
might cause a mismatch between the national-level intention of securing forest tenure 204 
for individual holdings and the local-level preference for more complex tenure 205 
arrangements. Thus, there is an urgent need to examine the actual property regime 206 
changes through the tenure reform and the local dynamics shaping the implementation 207 
of the national tenure reform policy.  208 
 209 
3. Methodology  210 
 211 
This research applied a multi-level analysis to examine the outcomes of CFTR, focusing 212 
on the changes in property regimes and the local dynamics that have shaped those 213 
changes. A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods was applied to generate 214 
a robust dataset for providing empirically-grounded and evidence-based results. To 215 
achieve this, different methods of data collection were applied at different levels to 216 
obtain rich insights into the tenure reform from different perspectives.  217 
 218 
3.1 Data collection 219 
First, at the national and the regional levels, the data on changes in forest area under 220 
each forest property regime were obtained from three time periods – the 6th 221 
(1999-2003), 7th (2004-2009) and 8th (2010-2014) National Forest Inventories carried 222 
out by the State Forestry Administration. Through comparison of the forest areas under 223 
each property regime, an overall picture of the outcome of the forest privatization was 224 
obtained for the entire country as well as the regional variations. As the actual result of 225 
privatization from the tenure reform, this provides clear statistics to evidence if the 226 
national goal of privatization has been achieved. Additionally, policy documents on the 227 
CFTR were investigated to understand the nature of the policy. Progress reports 228 
prepared by different levels of the government were reviewed for insights into the 229 
process and implementation of the policy change. The study of policy documents and 230 
reports from the central and regional levels provided for a sound understanding of the 231 
policy’s intentions and allowed examination of differences in implementation of the 232 
policy at different levels of government. At the national and the regional levels, 12 233 
in-depths interviews were conducted with key informants (i.e. government 234 
policymakers and forest sector officials) to obtain a deep understanding of the policy 235 
and the history and dynamics of the policy’s implementation.    236 
 237 
Second, at the village level, as informed by Magliocca et al. (2018), this research applied 238 
an in-depth ethnographic approach in four villages in Yunnan Province to provide 239 
knowledge of the CFTR using case-studies. These four villages were chosen as 240 
illustrators that cover a diversity of biophysical and socioeconomic conditions that are 241 
characteristic of rural China. Although these four case-studies are not statistically 242 
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representative of China as whole, they provide rich insights into the dynamics and 243 
diversity of the forest tenure reform. In particular, they help to capture a wide range of 244 
factors affecting the results of the reform. The illustrative case-studies represent 245 
different ecological zones and different ethnic groups, including Lisu people in the 246 
highland alpine zone in Deqin County, Han-Chinese in the uplands of the subtropical 247 
zone in Tengchong County, and Dai (Thai) people in the lowland tropical zone in 248 
Xishuangbanna Prefecture (Figure 1 and Table 1). Also, the four villages are engaged in 249 
different livelihood strategies and farming practices, which lead to different types and 250 
levels of forest use and management and different local economic conditions. The 251 
village-level case-studies used qualitative data collection to understand the local-level 252 
policy implementation processes and responses to the policy. A total of 54 interviews 253 
were conducted with key informants, including the village leaders at both the Natural 254 
Village and Administrative Village levels5, villagers involved in the reform, village elders, 255 
and leaders involved with the Village Forest Association. In addition, a total of four focus 256 
group discussions were conducted, with each consisting of four to five people and 257 
designed to gain deeper insight into the local perspectives of the reform policy’s 258 
implementation.  259 
 260 
                         
5 Natural Village is a natural settlement of several households ranging from 5-10 households, while several 
Natural Villages comprises an Administrative Village, which is the lowest administrative unit in the Chinese 
government structure. The ownership of collective forests can be held at both the Administrative and 




Figure 1. Locations of the study sites 263 
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Geography      
Area (km2) 202 24.05 53.19 1.91 
Elevation (m.a.s.l.) 3300-3800 1782-2506 1692-2546 1255-1500 
Socioeconomics     
Ethnicity Lisu Han-Chinese Han-Chinese Dai (Thai) 
Total households 
(2015) 
303 1212 1183  58 
Total population 
(2015) 
1091 5180 4577  286 
Net income per capita  305(USD, 2015) 1345 (USD, 2015) 1565(USD, 2015) 1367(USD, 2015) 
    Forestry     
Dominant natural forest 
vegetation 
Pine (Pinus armandii, P. 
yunnanesis), (Sabina 
pingii var. wilsonii) 
 
Fir (Taiwania flousiana, Tsuga 
Dumosa), Pine (P. Armandii, P. 
yunnanesis), Alder (Alnus 
nepalensis), 
Fir (T. flousiana, T. dumosa), 
Pine (P. armandii, P. 
yunnanesis), Alder (A. 
nepalensis). 
Pine (P. kesiya) 
Plantation  Walnut (Juglans sigillata) 
Walnut (J. sigillata), Fir (T. flousiana), 
Alder (Alnus spp.), oil tea (Camellia 
reticulata) 
Mixed forests of A. nepalensis, 
Betula alnoides, T. flousiana, T. 
dumosa 




Third, at the individual household level, a questionnaire survey was implemented in a 266 
face-to-face manner to understand personal perspectives of the underlying factors that 267 
have shaped the tenure reform. Using a random sampling strategy6, a total of 242 268 
farmers were selected in the four villages. The questionnaire focused on individual 269 
preferences for the distribution of revenues generated from the collective forest, in line 270 
with individualization (as the notion of privatization) and communalization principles of 271 
forest management7, as adapted from Martin et al. (2019)8. The respondents were asked 272 
to rank their choices from their most preferred to their least preferred to quantify their 273 
priorities among five methods of revenue distribution: 1) prioritizing rewards flowing 274 
to those who have contributed most to producing them (Contributor), 2) prioritizing 275 
those who experienced losses arising from forest management (Compensation), 3) 276 
prioritizing investment to generate public goods in the community (Community), 4) 277 
prioritizing poverty alleviation (Pro-poor), and 5) prioritizing an equal distribution of 278 
revenues among community members (Equality). The first two priorities refer to 279 
meritocratic forms of distribution as an individualization principle, while the remaining 280 
three methods reflect the principles of collective action and egalitarianism. Following 281 
completion of the structured questionnaire, open-ended questions were asked to 282 
elaborate on the respondent’s reasons for their choice of preference.  283 
 284 
3.2 Data analysis 285 
Quantitative and qualitative data analysis was carried out for each of the levels of 286 
investigation. At the national and regional levels, the national inventory data was 287 
analyzed quantitatively to present descriptive statistics of forest property regime 288 
changes across different regions and time periods, while qualitative data generated from 289 
the interviews with officials helped to understand the reason for those changes and the 290 
stories behind the changes evident in the statistics. At village level, the qualitative data 291 
were analyzed to generate insights into the policy implementation process and actual 292 
practical outcomes at the local-level, while the quantitative data relating to actual forest 293 
holdings and different forest regimes was incorporated to support the qualitative 294 
analysis of policy implementation. Finally, at the individual household level, SPSS 295 
(Statistic Package for Social Science) software was used to analyze the quantitative data 296 
generated from the survey questionnaire. A Chi-square test was performed to examine 297 
the significant differences among the different preference choices for forest benefit 298 
distribution and use. Qualitative data was presented to help understand the reasons 299 
behind those preference choices. 300 
                         
6 In each village, a name list of adult villagers provided by the village heads was coded by researchers; then 
the approximately 60 individuals were selected by a simple random sampling strategy for the questionnaire 
survey. When the selected person was not available, we interviewed the next person on the name list.   
7 The emphasis here is to examine preferences about the allocation of benefit from collective forest, which 
help to obtain insights on individualistic vs. communalist principles among individual farmers. It is not 
generalized to preferences concerning communal vs. private forest ownership.  
8 The survey is part of larger project led by the University of East Anglia (UK) entitled “Conservation, 
Market and Justice: Global and Local Perspectives”. The questionnaire used in the survey with English 
translation can be found in the supplementary materials.  
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 301 
4. Results  302 
4.1 National-level analysis 303 
There were significant changes to China’s forest property regimes alongside the 304 
country’s market liberalization process (Hyde et al., 2003). While private forests firstly 305 
emerged in the country in late 1980s through the Responsibility Forest (zherenshan) 306 
and Private Freehold Mountain (ziliushan) systems to provide management incentives 307 
for farmers, the most remarkable change occurred with the pilot forest tenure reform in 308 
late 2003 before becoming more nationally widespread in 2008. Table 2 shows the 309 
changes in forest area for the different property regimes in China from 1999-2014. It is 310 
clear that the area of private forests has been an important share of China’s total forest 311 
area since 1999-2003 when it accounted for 21% of the total forest area. Since then, its 312 
portion has continued to increase along with implementation of the CFTR. During the 313 
periods 1999-2003 to 2004-2009, private forests increased from 21% to 32% of China’s 314 
total forested area and then further increased to 44% during the period 2010-2014. 315 
Meanwhile, the collective forest area reduced from 38% to 29% between the sixth and 316 
seventh inventory periods (1999-2003 to 2004-2009) and continued to decline to 18% 317 
during the 2010-2014 period. In contrast, the portion of state forest has remained 318 
relatively stable over the last two decades. 319 
 320 
 321 










6th to 7th 
Inventory 
7t to 8th 
Inventory 
area % area % area % area % area % 
State 70.16 42 71.44 39 72.44 38 1.27 0.70 1.01 0.53 
Collective  63.89 38 51.77 29 35.00 18 -12.12 -6.68 -16.77 -8.77 
Private  34.96 21 58.18 32 83.73 44 23.21 12.80 25.56 13.37 
Total9  169.02 100 181.38 100 191.18 100 12.36 6.82 97941 0.05 
 
 323 
Source: State Forestry Administration, 6th, 7th and 8th National Forest Inventories. Note：Units = million of 324 
hectares (area). The National Forest Inventory is conducted every 5 years and was first conducted from 325 
1973 to 1976. But private forests were first recorded in the sixth inventory. Calculation of changes in the 326 
percentage of forest area under each type of property rights is informed by He et al. (2014) 327 
       328 
Table 2 also shows the percentage of change in forest area over time for the different 329 
property regimes. From the 6th to the 7th inventory, the private forest area increased by 330 
12.8% of the total forested area, while the collective forest area decreased by 6.68%. 331 
                         
9 The share of forest to the total land area in China was 17.61% in the 6th inventory, 18.89% in the 7th 
inventory and 19.91 % in the 8th inventory. But this number is different from forest coverage, which includes 
any form of tree cover with a canopy greater than 20%, such as trees on farms and roadside trees. 
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Similar patterns can be found from the 7th to the 8th inventory. Across the time period 332 
from 1999-2014, the collective forest area decreased from around 63 million ha to 35 333 
million ha (a decrease of around 28 million ha), while the private forest area increased 334 
from 34 million ha to 83 million ha (an increase of around 49 million ha). However, the 335 
decrease in the collective forests only accounted for 44.44 % of the total collective forest 336 
area from 1999 to 2014, which is far less than the national goal of 80% privatization. It 337 
is also noted that from Table 2, one cannot simply conclude that all the increases in 338 
private forest have resulted from the CFTR. Indeed, the increase in the private forest 339 
area is a result of nationwide afforestation programs, particularly the Sloping Land 340 
Conversion Program (SLCP). This program has converted approximately 8 million ha of 341 
cropland to forest, and this forest has been registered as private forest, thereby 342 
contributing to the increase in the private forest area at both the national and local 343 
levels (SFA, 2016).  344 
 345 
In sum, at the national level, forest privatization implemented through the tenure 346 
reform was much less than what government expected, as shown in national forest 347 
inventory datasets. Thus, a large portion of the collective forest area remains under 348 
communal management. Although forest officials realize the blanket approach to forest 349 
privatization cannot work well given the diversity of China, they continue to push for 350 
forest privatization across the country to meet the national target. As a result, they have 351 
begun to allow some types of communal forest to be regarded as privatized forest. This 352 
is further discussed below.  353 
 354 
4.2 Regional-level analysis  355 
Figure 2 shows the changes in forest area for the different property regimes from 356 
1999 to 2014 across four regions of China, namely the Northeast, Southwest, South and 357 
the Three-North regions. It also shows there has been an increase in the percentage of 358 
the private forest area in all regions expect the Northeast Region which has long been 359 
dominated by a state forest enterprise that manages the forest to supply national timber 360 
needs. In the other regions, we can see a clear decrease in the share of the collective and 361 
state forests and an increase in the share of the private forest.  362 
 363 
In the Southwest Region, the marked decrease in the collective forest area occurred 364 
after the CFTR was officially implemented in 2008. This region’s share of collective 365 
forest decreased from 33% in 2004-2009 to 18% in 2010-2014, while the private forest 366 
area increased from 21% to 37% over the same time period. In the South Region, the 367 
increase in the share of the private forest was greater between 1999-2003 and 368 
2004-2009 than between 2004-2009 to 2010-2014. This was because the tenure reform 369 
was firstly piloted in this region. In the Three-North Region, the share of the private 370 
forest area was increased across the three inventory time periods. Thus, it is evident 371 
that the effects of the Collective Forest Tenure Reform have varied across time and 372 
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across different regions, in line with the varying times of implementation of the reform 373 
across the different regions. 374 
 375 
 376 
Figure 2. Changes in forest property regimes across four regions of China 377 
 378 
Source: State Forestry Administration, 6th National Forest Inventory (1999-2003), 7th National Forestry 379 
Inventory (2004-2009), 8th National Forest Inventory (2010-2014).  380 
Note: Unit=million ha. The four forest regions were officially classified to include the following provinces: a) 381 
Northeast = Heilongjiang, Jilin and Inner Mongolia; b) Southwest = Sichuan (Chongqing included), Yunnan, 382 
and Tibet; c) South = Anhui, Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangxi, Hunan, Hubei, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, and 383 
Guizhou; d) Three-North = Liaoning, Hebei, Beijing, Tianjin, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Shanxi, Henan, 384 
Shaanxi, Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai, and Xinjiang.   385 
 386 
Figure 2, however, only tells part of the forest regime change story. Although the 387 
national-level analysis notes the increase in the private forest area derived from the 388 
SLCP, the actual allocation of collective forest is in question at the regional level, as in 389 
many cases, the forest privatization only appears on paper. He and Sikor (2017) report 390 
that the local government in Yunnan Province has included unallocated ecological 391 
forest10 as privatized forest to meet the high national requirement (i.e. 80%) for 392 
                         
10 Forest in China has been classified as two types according to the purpose of use: 1) economic forests that 
include fruit trees and timber forest that can been cut for commercial purposes, and 2) ecological forest that 
refers to the forest areas that are protected for ecological functions and public goods (i.e. ecosystem 
services).     
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privatization. The local government’s argument for doing so is that privatization cannot 393 
be implemented in ecological forests, as a private holding can mean the loss of 394 
government control, which could lead to a degradation of ecosystem services from these 395 
critical areas. This practice had been approved by the central government and applied to 396 
the entire Southwest Region which contains the largest area of ecological forest in China. 397 
Zinda and Zhang (2018) also found that in Deqin Prefecture in the Southwest Region, 398 
forests that are jointly held by several households have been regarded as privatized 399 
forest. In a number of these cases, the jointly-held forests cover large areas and involve 400 
over 20 households or a whole natural village. In the provinces of Jiangxi, Zhejiang and 401 
Fujian, scholars have also found forest have been reported as privatized (as individual 402 
holdings) when they are actually jointly-held collective forests (e.g. Shen et al., 2009). 403 
Also, de facto local re-collectivization of privatized forest has taken place in Jiangxi 404 
Province to ensure collective action after implementation of the reform (Luo et al., 2015; 405 
Liu and Ravenscroft, 2016). As many interviewed forest officials stated, the joint-holding 406 
is actually a form of communal forest management, but has been reported as privatized 407 
forest to ensure regions meet the national privatization goal. These officials also imply 408 
that including ecological forest as privatized forest also contributes to the meeting of the 409 
national requirement.  410 
 411 
In sum, while statistics show privatization of collective forest has increased in many 412 
regions, there is a large difference between the area of forest that has actually been 413 
privatized and that which is being reported. Current state statistics includes jointly-held 414 
forests and collectively-held ecological forest, which has led to overestimates of the 415 
forest privatization. In addition, there has been an increase in collective actions and 416 
re-collectivization to retain communal forest management (Liu and Ravenscroft, 2016), 417 
which also makes the reported private forest much greater than the reality. Therefore, 418 
the reported increase in the private forest area is not at the absolute expense of a 419 
decrease in the collective forest. The national goal of privatization of the collective forest 420 
area has clearly led to large regional-level variations in implementation.  421 
 422 
4.3 Illustrative case-studies 423 
The case-studies were conducted in four selected villages in Yunnan Province. The 424 
community-level analysis was conducted in these villages to understand how different 425 
villages have responded to the forest tenure reform and the outcomes of the reform in 426 
term of the changes in forest holdings. At the local-level, the significance of forest tenure 427 
lies not only in the allocation of forest management responsibility but also in the 428 
allocation of economic benefits secured from that forest. For example, 429 
collectively-managed land can involve different forms of benefit sharing including 430 
greater and lesser forms of individualization. For this reason, we explored preferences 431 
for collective (vs. private forest management) by using non-structured interviews and 432 
the preferences concerning different forms of benefit distribution, in addition, by using 433 
structured questions. The latter preference was explored through the individual 434 
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household-level analysis. This focus on distribution preferences also provides us with 435 
further insights into the factors shaped the tenure reform in the case-study villages. Also, 436 
we intend to use both the community and individual household levels of analysis from 437 
the empirically-grounded case-studies as illustrators to show the local contexts and 438 
variations in the CFTR, with a particular focus on local dynamics and local preferences 439 
for tenure arrangements and senses of communality and individuality.   440 
 441 
4.3.1 Community-level analysis 442 
All four villages implemented the CFTR between 2007 and 2008, when, as per the policy, 443 
they were required to allocate collectively-held forests to individual households. 444 
However, there is still a large portion of village-level forest that remains 445 
collectively-owned forest. As Table 3 shows, over 75% of the village-level forest remains 446 
as collective holdings. Each village has responded to the CFTR differently to retain the 447 
collective holding, although the provincial government intended to achieve 95% 448 
privatization of the collective forest11. 449 
 450 
Table 3. Forest tenure and holders in the four case-study villages 451 
Village Form of tenure and holder Area (ha) % 
Xinqi Collective forest held by the Administrative Village 1650 60 
Shareholding forest held by the Natural Village  339 12 
Individual holdings 784 28 
  
Baojia 
Collective forest held by the Administrative Village 1371 83 
Individual holdings 280 17 
Shiba  Collective forest held by the Administrative Village 5980.2 100 
Manhong Collective forest held by the Administrative Village 78.4 100 
 Source: data obtained in 2016 from Forest Departments in Baoshan, Xishuangbanna and Deqin.   452 
 453 
In Xinqi, farmers have a long tradition of communal forest management, following their 454 
establishment of the first forest farm for collective management in the 1960s. Later, the 455 
collectively-managed forest farm was expanded to 15 forest farms, which now include 456 
more than 2000 ha of collective forest. The revenue from the collective forest 457 
contributes significantly to public infrastructure including for road construction and 458 
school buildings. After implementation of the forest tenure reform, Xinqi has retained 459 
three types of forest holdings, as shown in Table 3: 1) the collective forest owned by the 460 
Administrative Village, which accounts for about 60% of the total forest area, 2) Natural 461 
Village collective forest through a shareholding system that accounts for 12% of the 462 
total forest area, and 3) the individual forests held by private households that account 463 
for 28% of the total forest area. As the provincial government has aimed for a 95% 464 
privatization rate, the village head of Xinqi had to go the County Forest Department to 465 
                         
11 The provincial government aimed for a higher percentage of privatization than the national goal to show 
their capability to the central government.  
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negotiate with the vice-director to give them an exception for keeping the large area of 466 
collective forest. 467 
“I used three arguments to persuade the director to approve our case. 468 
First, I said: “According to the policy, once two-thirds of the villagers 469 
approve the plan we have to follow this collective decision based on 470 
the Village Autonomy Law [Village Organic Law]. Second, collective 471 
management of the forest has greatly benefited the local economy and 472 
the village so that we do not require external money for road 473 
construction, school-building and so forth. We should keep this 474 
collective forest. Third, we have had bad experiences in the past with 475 
allocated forest being rapidly cleared. For its ecological function and 476 
economic reasons, we need to keep the collective forest.” [Interviewed 477 
in Xinqi on 13 April, 2011]  478 
 479 
In Baojia, following redistribution of forests during the 1980s, there was large-scale 480 
deforestation. Many farmers stated this was because the forest tenure reform in the 481 
1980s did not provide a clear duration for the forest holding contracts. Many people 482 
were afraid the government would take back the forest, and this uncertainty caused 483 
many villagers to cut the trees for timber. The village head then asked to be able to 484 
re-collectivize their forest for communal management to avoid the deforestation and 485 
also to carry out collective reforestation efforts. Many years later, the forest is 486 
recovering well, and this has been supported by the communal management. In 2000, 487 
Baojia’s forests were designated as a national park for developing ecotourism, as the 488 
forest grows in a volcanic area. Therefore, when the CFTR was carried out in Baojia, 489 
there was little redistribution of the forest, as there was a community desire to retain 490 
the traditional communal management to strengthen their bargaining power with the 491 
tourist company when seeking compensation. Also, the village communal management 492 
was seen to help the community better protect the forest. The perception of one farmer 493 
about the collective management approach is outlined below:   494 
 495 
 “If we allocate the forest to individuals, the tourist company will come 496 
to deal with individuals one by one with a lower price. If the forest is 497 
collective forest, they have to deal with us as a whole. Any agreement 498 
has to get approval by over 2/3 of the villagers. So we have more 499 
power to negotiate with the company.” [Interviewed in Baojia on 20 500 
April 2014]   501 
   502 
In Shiba, although the Lisu people own large areas of the forest, the forest has never 503 
been distributed to individual households since the founding of the People’s Republic of 504 
China.  Situated in Deqin County, Shiba used to be part of a major logging area, due to 505 
the region’s high forest coverage and quality timber. Since 1998, the Natural Forest 506 
Protection Program (known as the ‘logging ban’) has been implemented to protect the 507 
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upper watershed of the Yangtze River. Along with implementation of the logging ban, 508 
the people’s livelihoods have shifted from being timber-oriented to diversified strategies 509 
that include ecotourism and non-wood forest products. Now, the people of Shiba are 510 
particularly reliant on the commercial collection of Matsutake mushrooms, which often 511 
make up to 80% of the household’s cash income. The mushroom resource is managed as 512 
common property that allows for the inclusive access for all village members. Given the 513 
significant proportion of income that the mushrooms provide for households, the 514 
villagers were not willing to allocate the forest to individual households, as the 515 
mushroom is unequally distributed throughout the forest. This was discussed by one 516 
villager: 517 
“we cannot allocate the forest to individual households. Otherwise, we 518 
will have conflict in mushroom collection, as the mushroom is 519 
traditionally collected in our communal forest. The allocation of forest 520 
to individual household will make somebody’s forest had abundance of 521 
mushroom production, and others may have none. That will definitely 522 
cause conflict. So, the allocation cannot be practically carried out, as 523 
the agreement for forest allocation will be never made.” [interviewed 524 
in Shiba on 1 May, 2015]  525 
 526 
Manhong, a village of the Dai ethnic minority in Xishuangbanna Prefecture, is a small 527 
village with only 78.3 ha of forest. Despite this small area, the forest is of significant 528 
cultural importance to the villagers as it is considered a sacred forest in accordance with 529 
their religious customs. The sacred forest is therefore traditionally protected as a 530 
cultural landscape where only ritual activities can be carried out. Thus, the forest 531 
provides cultural services to the whole community and is collectively managed by the 532 
community members. The sacred forest is also located in an upper watershed, which 533 
means it provides important environmental services to the downstream Dai people who 534 
cultivate rice paddies in the valleys. Thus, the village prefers to keep the forest as a 535 
communally-managed resource to protect the cultural and environmental values of the 536 
small watershed, as described by one villager: 537 
“The Long Shan (the sacred forest) cannot be allocated. It is the forest 538 
where our ancestors and god live….. it belongs to the whole community, 539 
and cannot be distributed to households…….[this] forest is small area, 540 
but it is our watershed forest, it provide water supply. We are afraid 541 
the forest allocation will lead to forest degradation and water shortage.” 542 
[Interviewed in Manhong on 20 January, 2016]  543 
 544 
In sum, the different villages have different reasons for retaining significant proportions 545 
of the collective forest for communal management. At the community level, the revenues 546 
generated from the collective forests can make significant contributions to the village 547 
economy and be used for needed public infrastructure or other community-based 548 
investments, as evident in Xinqi. In Baojia, the village has retained the collective forest to 549 
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enhance their bargaining power when dealing with other stakeholders. In Shiba, the 550 
collectively-owned forest provides provisional services for the collection of non-wood 551 
forest products (particularly Matsutake mushrooms) that are an important basis of 552 
alternative livelihoods. This communal forest management approach also avoids 553 
potential community conflict due to the uneven distribution of mushrooms throughout 554 
the forest. In Manhong, the collective forest is of high importance for the local people for 555 
cultural reasons and to protect their watershed, meaning they believe the forest cannot 556 
be privatized. And in Manhong and Shiba in particular, it is ultimately the spatial 557 
indivisibility of benefits that makes privatization a poor fit with the community’s needs. 558 
Thus, these community’s ecological, economic and cultural considerations mean that 559 
forest privatization might not be an appropriate match with their needs.   560 
 561 
4.3.2 Individual household-level of analysis 562 
The national-level and regional-level analyses show a strong national push towards 563 
forest privatization that is being unevenly realized across the regions. The village-level 564 
cases reveal diverse reasons why some communities are resisting privatization. The 565 
resistance is dependent on particular place-based social and economic characteristics 566 
such as local histories of collective management, the presence of a valuable but unevenly 567 
distributed non-wood resource, or the present need to negotiate with a more powerful 568 
land-use stakeholder. In this section, to understand the underlying reasons behind the 569 
resistance to privatization at an individual household level, we examine farmer’s 570 
perceptions within the villages by exploring their preferences for revenue allocation 571 
from collective forests. In particular, we are interested in whether respondents favor 572 
methods of distribution in line with the principles of individualization versus 573 
communalization.  574 
 575 
Figure 3. Farmers’ preferences for the allocation of forest benefits. 576 
 577 
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Source: village survey 2015-2016; note: n=242. 578 
 579 
As Figure 3 (a) shows, the most popular preference for benefit distribution is to use the 580 
forest-based revenue for community purposes or public goods. This preference was 581 
noted by 45% of the 242 interviewees. The ‘Equality’ option was preferred by 32%, the 582 
‘Pro-poor’ by 13%, and the ‘Contributor’ and ‘Compensation’ options were both 583 
preferred by 5% of the interviewees. The Chi-square testing among the group of most 584 
preferred benefit distribution options shows its significant level at p<0.0001 585 
(Chi-square=155.81, df=4). Both the ‘Contributor’ and ‘Compensation’ options represent 586 
forms of individualization of benefits based on individual deservedness – the former 587 
based on reward for effort, the latter based on opportunity cost. Together, these 588 
preferences for individualization of benefit distribution amount to only 10% of 589 
preferences. On the other hand, Figure 3 (b) shows that most (40%) of the interviewees 590 
chose ‘Contributor’ as their least preferred option, while 16% chose ‘Compensation’. The 591 
selection of ‘Community’ and ‘Pro-poor’ account for 4% and 19% respectively. The 592 
chi-square testing among the group of least preference shows its statistically significant 593 
level at p<0.001(Chi-square=81.76, df =4).  594 
 595 
The results presented in Figure 3 show a strong desire by individual farmers for the 596 
communal principle rather than the individualization principle as the basis for 597 
forest-based revenue allocation. Farmers consider that communal forest management 598 
can contribute to the effectiveness and efficiency of forest management for improving 599 
forest quality as well as for community-based public goods. This was evident in a 600 
number of farmers’ statements, like the ones presented below: 601 
 602 
“It is not a good idea to allocate many forest to individual. That will 603 
become a fragmentation of forest holding. Individual smallholders 604 
cannot manage the forest effectively and efficiently. So they cannot 605 
achieve economics of scale of management. Then, it would be high cost 606 
for us and our forest quality will get bad.” [Interviewed in Xinqi on 10 607 
Feb. 2012]   608 
 609 
“….we can only protect the forest collectively that we can have good 610 
environment [habitat] for mushroom grows, that will benefit all the 611 
communities.” [interviewed in Shiba on 5 May, 2015]  612 
 613 
Villagers also discussed the social justice dimension for communal forest management, 614 
which they consider privatization cannot meet:  615 
 616 
“We use those money [revenues from collective forest] as matching 617 
fund from national fund for infrastructure development, like road and 618 
water pipes in our village. I think this is more fair to get everybody 619 
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have equal benefit from these money [from the collective forest]. We 620 
had very bad experiences when we have to collect money from each 621 
household for building the village road. Some villagers may contribute 622 
money, some villagers may not. That is really unfair, as the road is built 623 
for publics.” [Interviewed in Baojia on 26 April, 2015] 624 
 625 
“we use those revenues (from the collective forest) as public fund for 626 
public goods. We build temples, clinic, school and roads by using 627 
revenues from the timber harvest [in the collective forest]. We also buy 628 
the health insurance to everybody by using those revenues. We think 629 
this is more fair, as everybody need walk on those road, send kids to 630 
school, go to clinic.” [Interviewed in Xinqi on 2nd March, 2016]  631 
 632 
In sum, farmers preference to retain collectively-owned forest for communal 633 
management for reasons of forest management effectiveness and efficiency and 634 
ensuring all the village members benefit from management of the forests. The 635 
communal management of forests was also chosen by the local people from a justice 636 
perspective, with the belief that privatization of forest management will not deliver this 637 
important outcome. The basis of the farmers’ resistance to forest privatization and their 638 
preferences for local collective action includes the history of the community, the need to 639 
retain their barging power with other stakeholders, concerns about the potential for 640 
uneven distribution of resources and benefits, and community-based cultural beliefs and 641 
needs. As such, the principle of forest privatization has been rejected by individual 642 
farmers interviewed in this study.   643 
 644 
5. Discussion and Conclusions  645 
The Chinese government has made a substantial investment in improving its forest 646 
tenure system via a privatization approach to increase the allocation of individual 647 
holdings from the collectively-owned forest resource. While the government believes 648 
this reform can improve the local incentive for forest management through an equal 649 
distribution of the collective forest resource, the on-ground results appear very different 650 
to the government’s intention. Differing from existing literature, this research provides 651 
thoughtful insights into China’s CFTR by using a multi-level analysis of the reform. As 652 
the study has indicated, far less privatization of forest than what the government 653 
expected has actually occurred. The theoretical and empirical implications drawn from 654 
this research lie in four aspects.  655 
 656 
First, this research reveals the gap between government intentions and local 657 
practices occurred when pre-existing local contexts were ignored in devolution reform 658 
of forest tenure systems. While there can be a willingness from state authorities to 659 
provide more rights to local people and communities, local contexts can shape the 660 
reform and lead to unexpected results that widely differ from the state’s intentions. In 661 
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the case of China, the central government has considered privatization of forests to be 662 
the best approach for improving the country’s forest tenure system and resource 663 
security. However, as this research shows (based on analyses of national-level and 664 
regional-level datasets), when the state pushed for large-scale privatization, only about 665 
44% of their proposed allocation of collective forest to individuals was implemented12. 666 
Also, while there is much forest privatization recorded on paper, communal 667 
management remains common in practice (He and Sikor, 2017; Zinda and Zhang, 2018). 668 
Studies from elsewhere also show that when states push for tenure reforms, there can 669 
be a range of unexpected outcomes including communalization, conflict and forest 670 
degradation, particularly when states ignore pre-existing local contexts and apply a 671 
top-down implementation of policies (e.g. Lane, 2003; Guneau and Tozzi, 2008, Sikor et 672 
al., 2017; Robinson et al., 2014; Gebara, 2018). In China, where state policies are usually 673 
top-down implemented, there is a need for the government to better understand and 674 
respond to local needs and contexts.  675 
 676 
Second, this research suggests that local preferences for tenure arrangements are 677 
very complicated and can greatly differ from simple privatization. In many cases, the 678 
local communities might want to retain their traditional communal (and complex) 679 
tenure system, instead of seeking private property rights (e.g. Haenn, 2006; Perramond, 680 
2008; Cellarius, 2011). As shown in this research, local customary arrangements for 681 
commons interests, cultural needs, and emerging values of non-wood forest product 682 
collection and ecotourism development can form different and complicated tenure 683 
arrangements for communal use of forest resources. Individual considerations of 684 
communality are embedded within community needs and individual preferences. Thus, 685 
the state’s understanding of egalitarian forest distribution via privatization may not 686 
match local preferences. In Xinqi, people believe communal forest use rather than 687 
privatization could better contribute to public goods through a fair distribution of forest 688 
benefits, while in Shiba, there is a desire to retain the communal forest holding system 689 
to enable the equal access to valuable mushrooms. These examples reflect complex local 690 
perspectives of equality in forest tenure reforms. In Baojia, the community wish to 691 
retain the communal forest to strengthen their bargaining power when they confront 692 
external powerful actors like tourism companies, while cultural services are a more 693 
important reason for Manhong village’s desire to retain the traditional communal forest 694 
management system. Thus, as suggested in existing literature, improving the tenure 695 
arrangement cannot rely on titling programs alone. Of greater importance is 696 
incorporating local preferences by empowering local communities to play a role in the 697 
tenure reform decision-making (Robinson et al., 2018).  698 
 699 
Third, this research has suggested that communal management of forest resources 700 
supports less conflict when there is emerging diversification of forest property rights, 701 
                         
12 But there are also cases where the rate of privatization was larger than the case shown in this research, 
being in Fujian and Zhejiang provinces, where there is strong local preference for privatization, as noted by 
Qin et la. (2013), Liu et al. (2017) and Li et al. (2016). 
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because communal systems are more embedded in the local contexts and 702 
social-ecological systems. Globally, there is currently emerging diversification of forest 703 
property rights that goes beyond the rights to forestland and timber (Sikor et al., 2017). 704 
For example, the increasing value of non-wood forest products, monetary benefits being 705 
derived from environmental services, and cultural ecosystem services requiring the 706 
forest to be managed in a form of communal management (e.g. Yang et al., 2009; He et al. 707 
2014; Mujawamariya and Burger, 2016). Forest titling programs for privatization may 708 
not fit those complexities. Communal forest management therefore would allow an 709 
inclusive and equal access to the forest and forest benefits, while privatization might 710 
lead to potential conflict in forest-dependent communities. In most forest tenure 711 
reforms, there is a separation of forestland and timber from other provisional, 712 
environmental and cultural services, which could be problematic. Instead, there is a 713 
need for a holistic understanding of the local social-ecological system in tenure 714 
arrangements to meet local complexities and adaptabilities in tenure reforms.     715 
 716 
Finally, the specificities in the case of China drawn from this research call for 717 
discussion about the effectiveness, efficiency and justice from local conceptions of forest 718 
management. While dominant thinking from economists is that privatization of forests 719 
will lead to forest management cost-effectiveness and efficiencies, the individual-level 720 
analysis presented in this research suggests local perceptions can be different. Rather, 721 
the local perception of effectiveness and efficiency is locally- and culturally-embedded 722 
into variations of social-ecological conditions, which might include the consideration of 723 
forest fragmentation, uneven resource distribution, public goods and cultural needs. 724 
These perceptions formed the basis of a unique consideration of justice, which differs 725 
from the market economy perception of privatization. Research and policy are thus 726 
required to incorporate local perceptions and recognize the local differences in 727 
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